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I. INTRODUCTION
There are many forms of adult behavior that may seriously inhibit or
prevent a child from reaching full human potential. Essentially, it is this
kind of behavior to which we apply the terms "child abuse" and "child
neglect."' In its most blatant and recognizable form, child maltreatment may
consist of physical beatings or failure to provide basic necessities such as
food, clothing, or medicine. Child development experts and other profes-
sionals, however, have identified other less obvious forms of child
maltreatment that cause at least as much long-term damage to the child as
does a brutal physical battering. For example, failure to provide a basic level
of nurturing through physical contact and emotional support can cause
"failure to thrive syndrome" or even death to both infants and very young
* A.B. 1977, University of Notre Dame; J.D. 1980, Yale Law School; Assistant Professor of
Law, Marquette University Law School, Milwaukee, Wisconsin. The author wishes to thank the
Family Institute of Marquette University, which supported initial research for this Article and
sponsored an interdisciplinary seminar on family issues in which the author participated. The
author also wishes to thank Alan Madry and Charles McMullen for their helpful comments on
earlier drafts of this Article.
1. This Article employs the term "maltreatment," which includes both child abuse and
child neglect.
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children.2 Such deprivation may also cause severe problems in older children
ranging from depression or suicidal tendencies to aggressive and violent
behavior, learning problems, and an inability to form normal relationships
with others.3 Children that are subjected to sexually inappropriate behavior
may also suffer severe consequences. Moreover, adult maltreatment of
children is much more likely to occur in already stressful circumstances such
as those experienced by families struggling with poverty, divorce, or sub-
stance abuse.4 All of these difficult situations are growing problems in our
society, and are frequently accompanied by child maltreatment.
Recent research about the various forms of child maltreatment has
been accompanied by new statutes addressing these problems.5 Some state
statutes specifically address the problems of neglect, as well as emotional,
physical, and sexual abuse.6 Like most laws dealing with maltreatment of
children in the United States, however, these statutes essentially authorize
after-the-fact interventions. 7 If specific adult-inflicted damage to the child
can be demonstrated, the law will intervene. Unfortunately, in many cases
remedies are available only after irreparable harm has been done.
There are different ways to characterize what the law can accomplish in
a given context, and different laws may be suited to achieving different goals.
Laws may punish certain behaviors, which along with societal pressure, may
deter certain behaviors. Punishment also has a retributive goal: laws may
attempt to prevent some behaviors by eliminating offensive aspects of the
behavior.
In the case of child maltreatment statutes, there are likely a number of
goals. The types of statutes discussed in this Article are largely after-the-fact
intervention laws impacting cases in which maltreatment has already
occurred, and they potentially achieve some laudable goals. These statutes
tend to set out minimum standards of parenting, thereby providing an educa-
2. See infra text accompanying note 150.
3. See infra text accompanying notes 85-106.
4. See infra text accompanying notes 74-84.
5. See, e.g., SANFORD KATZ, WHEN PARENTS FAIL 60-68 (1971). Minnesota and Idaho are
unique because they have statutes specifically addressing emotional neglect of the child and the
psychological health of the parent. Part II of this Article illustrates thdt many state statutes now
address issues of psychological well-being. See infra text accompanying notes 18-58.
6. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.556(1)-(2) (West Supp. 1993) (mandating reporting of
physical abuse, sexual abuse, or neglect of minors in certain circumstances); OHIO REV. CODE §
2151.031 (Page 1990) (defining "abused child" to include a child who is a victim of "sexual activity"
or who "exhibits evidence of physical or mental injury or death, inflicted by other than accidental
means").
7. For example, the Minnesota statute cited at supra note 6 is a reporting statute, which
necessarily implies that something has happended that must be reported. See MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 626.556(1)-(2) (West Supp. 1993). Likewise, for a child to exhibit evidence of physical or mental
injury or death under the Ohio statute cited, the injuring act must have already occurred. See
OHIO REV. CODE § 2151.031 (Page 1990).
[Vol. 41
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tional function and an influential statement of acceptable social norms. 8
These statutes also serve a retributive as well as (hopefully) deterrent pur-
pose by punishing persons that maltreat children.9 Finally, the statutes
attempt to protect children from the harm caused by specific forms of
maltreatment.10
This Article argues that the after-the-fact laws dealing with the prob-
lems.of emotional and sexual child maltreatment are inherently inadequate
to achieve the goal of protecting children from maltreatment. These retroac-
tive statutes also have drawbacks in cases of physical abuse. The Article
focuses, however, on emotional and sexual maltreatment, because certain
dynamics evident in those types of maltreatment make these laws even more
problematic than when applied in circumstances of physical abuse. Even if
such statutes could be applied and enforced perfectly by adequately staffed
and funded social service organizations and police departments, there are at
least three theoretical reasons a significant percentage of emotionally and
sexually maltreated children cannot be protected.
First, the nature of after-the-fact laws dictates there will be no mean-
ingful intervention until significant harm has already been inflicted on the
child.'1 Depression, anxiety, and "acting out" are behaviors that may indicate
mental harm to a child,1 2 and are likely to develop gradually in response to a
pattern of long-term destructive adult treatment. 13 Once established, these
maladaptive behavior patterns may be difficult to reverse.1 4 Yet, if this were
the only problem with these statutes, the law at least could help to prevent
subsequent abuse to victims for the balance of their childhood years.
The second problem with after-the-fact laws is that in many cases of
emotional and sexual abuse, proof of harm or other indicators of abuse may
not be apparent until the victim has reached adolescence or adulthood. 5 This
8. See infra text accompanying notes 18-58.
9. See infra text accompanying notes 18-58.
10. See infra text accompanying notes 18-58.
11. This is also true in cases of physical maltreatment, but is mitigated by the fact that the
ascertainable injury such as a burn mark or broken bone appears immediately after the abusive
act.
12. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. § 948.01(2) (1991). "Mental harm' means substantial harm to a
child's psychological or intellectual functioning which may be evidenced by a substantial degree of
certain characteristics of the child including, but not limited to, anxiety, depression, withdrawal or
outward aggressive behavior.'" Id. (emphasis added).
13. See infra text accompanying notes 85-106.
14. Cf BEVERLY ENGEL, THE RIGHT TO INNOCENCE 10-16 (1989). Many of the long-term
symptoms associated with child sexual abuse, such as eating disorders, substance abuse,
flashbacks, or chronic depression, are by their nature ongoing behaviors that are difficult to treat.
See id.
15. Events that typically trigger the recovery of repressed memories of childhood sexual
abuse include puberty, adult sexual relations, and the death of the perpetrator. See generally
ELLEN BASS & LAURA DAVIS, THE COURAGE TO HEAL A GUIDE FOR WOMEN SURVIVORS OF
CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE 70-83 (1988).
.1992]
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is due to the nature of such abuse, as well as the psychological defenses
characteristically employed by children in order to survive.16 In the case of
emotional maltreatment, for example, the sort of demonstrable harm con-
templated by some statutes may not become apparent until long after the
damaging acts. In addition, sexual abuse statutes do not require proof of
emotional harm, but because the clues that such abuse is occurring are
behavioral rather than physical, there is the same time lag between the mal-
treatment and detection. 17 In other words, the damage has been long done
and reinforced before the symptoms may become obvious. State intervention
at this point may satisfy a desire for retribution, but would not save the
victim from harm.
The third problem with after-the-fact statutes is that it is even more
difficult to delineate and recognize behaviors constituting emotional or sexual
abuse than those constituting physical abuse. Burning, beating, or shaking
are dramatic actions leaving characteristic marks, such as bruises, scars, and
broken bones. In contrast, acts of emotional or sexual maltreatment may be
covert; the origins of the depression, aggression, and other behaviors that
may result are difficult to identify in some settings because they could be the
result of other causes.
After-the-fact laws have valid uses, but more laws of this type will not
effectively protect "at risk" children. This Article uses current social science
research in the area of child maltreatment to illustrate the limitations of
these ex post laws. It concludes that the law must shift its focus, perhaps to
laws that can provide a structure for preventing child maltreatment. Only by
acknowledging where our current laws fail can we begin to seek more effec-
tive means of addressing the problem of child maltreatment.
II. STATUTES DEALING WITH CHILD MALTREATMENT
In order to evaluate the claim that many of the current statutory
approaches to child maltreatment are fundamentally inadequate, it is first
necessary to briefly examine the nature of those statutes.
There are three federal statutes directly addressing the problems of
child maltreatment: the Indian Child Protection and Family Violence
Prevention Act,18 the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment and Adoption
16. See infra text accompanying notes 74-106.
17. Some effects associated with child sexual abuse, such as sleeping disturbances or sexual
precocity, may occur relatively soon after the abuse. See LEONARD KARP & CHERYL L. KARP,
DOMESTIC TORTS: FAMILY VIOLENCE, CONFLICT AND SEXUAL ABUSE 169-70 (1989). Other
effects such as substance abuse, character disorders, eating disorders, or sexual dysfunction,
however, are likely to make a delayed appearance in adolescence or adulthood. Id.
18. Indian Child Protection and Family Violence Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 101-630, 104
Stat. 4544 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 3201-3211 (Supp. 1992)).
486 [Vol. 41
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Reform Act of 1978,19 and the Victims of Child Abuse Act of 1990.20 The first
deals with the particular problems facing Native American children.21 The
other two deal with child maltreatment generally, focusing on funding for
research and enforcement, providing uniform definitions and standards, and
encouraging prevention and education. 22 Actual interventions into individual
families, however, are undertaken pursuant to state laws, and it is these laws
that are the primary focus of this Article.
There are two types of state legislative approaches to the problem of
child maltreatment. Criminal statutes generally focus on punishment of the
perpetrator.23 Child protective services statutes, on the other hand, seek to
remove the child from the inadequate environment and provide treatment for
the parents, with the goal of eventual reunification wherever possible. 24
These statutes may co-exist in the same states,25 and represent the tension
between the desire to punish people that mistreat children, and the desire to
offer nonpunitive interventions to protect the children of families in trouble.
Among the many criticisms leveled against the protective services approach, 26
perhaps the most significant is that the professed "nonpunitive" character of
the process is illusory, given the fact that most adults will probably perceive
state intervention as punitive.
Much of the current approach to legal intervention in cases of child
abuse and neglect originates with C. Henry Kempe's 1962 work, which identi-
fied the "battered child syndrome."27 The battered child syndrome is a
19. Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment and Adoption Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No.
95-266, 92 Stat. 205 (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5118 (1988 & Supp. 1990)). The
provisions dealing with child maltreatment are currently found at 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5107 (1988 &
Supp. 1990).
20. Victims of Child Abuse Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, 104 Stat. 4792 (codified at 42
U.S.C. §§ 13001-13055 (Supp. 1990)).
21. See 25 U.S.C. § 3201(a), (b) (Supp. 1992).
22. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5107 (1988 & Supp. 1990); 42 U.S.C. §§ 13001-13055 (Supp.
1990).
23. See Hicks v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 649-51 (1988) for a case in which the court examined
whether contempt of court imposed, when a parent failed to pay child support, was civil or
criminal relief, and held that criminal relief is essestially punitive while civil relief is remedial.
24. See, for example ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, para. 2052 (Smith-Hurd 1988) which charges
the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services with the responsibility to
protect the best interests of the child, offer protective services in order to prevent any
further harm to the child and to other children in the same environment or family,
stabilize the home environment, preserve family life wherever possible and protect the
health and safety of children in all situations in which they are vulnerable to child
abuse or neglect.
Id. (emphasis added).
25. See, e.g., id. ch. 23 para. 2354-55.
26. See generally JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE
CHILD (1973) (arguing that any state intervention would likely do more harm than good because
it jeopardizes a child's paramount need for continuity of relationships).
27. C. Henry Kempe et al., The Battered-Child Syndrome, in TRAUMATIC ABUSE AND
NEGLECT OF CHILDREN AT HOME 89 (Gertrude J. Williams & John Money eds., 1980).
1992]
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pattern of physical injuries of a type unlikely to be accidental, and which,
upon diagnostic evaluation, can be demonstrated to have occurred over a
continuing period of time.28 Kempe's work caused new attention to be focused
on the problem of child abuse, and most states now have more comprehensive
statutes addressing child maltreatment.29 Before Kempe's work, however,
most state statutes were designed to curb only severe physical abuse causing
loss or endangerment of life or permanent and serious physical injury.30 Even
in such severe cases, intervention was often somewhat sporadic.31
Gradually, researchers became aware of severe psychological dangers
posed by physical abuse and neglect, and further research revealed a wide
range of behaviors that could be equally damaging to a developing child.3 2
The legislative response to this increasing psychological knowledge was a
plethora of laws specifically attacking emotional and sexual maltreatment as
well as physical maltreatment. 3
The statutes addressing emotional maltreatment fall into three cate-
gories. The first type uses language that chiefly describes physical
maltreatment, and does not address psychological maltreatment specifically.
For example, the Illinois statute provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person having the care or custody of any
child, wilfully to cause or permit the life of such child to be endangered,
or the health of such child to be injured, or wilfully cause or permit such
child to be placed in such a situation that its life or health may be
endangered. 34
28. Id. at 90.
29. See infra text accompanying notes 39-60.
30. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, para. 2053b (Smith-Hurd 1988).
31. See generally Elizabeth Pleck, Criminal Approaches to Family Violence 1640-1980, in 11
FAMILY VIOLENCE 19 (Lloyd Ohlin & Michael Tonry eds., 1989).
32. See generally JAMES GARBARINO & GWEN GILLIAM, UNDERSTANDING ABUSIVE
FAMILIES (1980).
33. Actually, laws that addressed mental harm to children can be seen as both increasing
and decreasing intervention in such cases, depending on how these statutes are interpreted.
Requiring proof of actual harm in order to justify state intervention meant that vague or
externally observable parental behavior, such as lack of moral supervision, would no longer justify
intervention. See Judith Areen, Intervention Between Parent and Child: A Reappraisal of the
State's Role in Child Neglect and Abuse Cases, 63 GEO. L.J. 887, 911 (1975).
34. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, para. 2354 (Smith-Hurd 1988). New York offers another
example of this type of statute. Section 1012 of the New York Family Court Act states:
"Abused child" means a child less than (18] years of age whose parent or other
person legally responsible for his care
(i) inflicts or allows to be inflicted upon such child physical injury by other than
accidental means which causes or creates a substantial risk of death, or serious or
protracted disfigurement, or protracted impairment of physical or emotional health, or
protracted loss or impairment of the funtion of any bodily organ, or
(ii) creates or allows to be created a substantial risk of physical injury to such
child by other than accidental means which would be likely to cause death or serious or
[Vol. 41
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Although the term "health" could theoretically include mental as well as
physical health, the term has been construed quite literally under this
statute to mean only physical well-being.35 Additionally, "merely" causing
pain to a child has been found to be insufficient to constitute a violation.36
The second type of statute specifically outlaws emotional maltreatment
as well as physical abuse, but offers no statutory standard for ascertaining
when emotional maltreatment is present.37 Such statutes rely instead on
vague and subjective terms like "mental injury" or "harm to mental health."
For instance, the Minnesota statute states: "A parent, legal guardian, or
caretaker who endangers the child's person or health by intentionally causing
or permitting a child to be placed in a situation iikely to substantially harm
the child's physical or mental health or cause the child's death is guilty of
protracted disfigurement, or protracted impairment of physical or emotional health, or
protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily organ, or
(iii) commit or allows to be committed, a sex offense against such child, as defined
in the penal law ....
N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1012(e) (McKinney 1984) (emphasis added). The statute goes on to give a
specific definition of "impairment of emotional health*:
"Impairment of emotional health" and "impairment of mental or emotional
condition" includes a state of substantially diminished psychological or intellectual
functioning in relation to, but not limited to, such factors as failure to thrive, control of
aggressive or self-destructive impulses, ability to think and reason, or acting out or
misbehavior, including incorrigibility, ungovernability or habitual truancy; provided,
however, that such impairment must be clearly attributable to the unwillingness or
inability of the respondent to exercise a minimum degree of care toward the child.
Id. § 1012(h). Although this statute reveals a rather sophisticated awareness of behaviors that
may indicate impaired emotional health, the language of § 1012(e) seems to limit intervention for
emotional impairment to those cases where the impairment is a direct result of inflicted physical
injury or neglect.
35. Cf People v. Vandiver, 283 N.E.2d 681 (Ill. 1971). In finding that the Illinois statute
was not unconsitutionally vague, the court discussed the defendant's contention that the word
"health," as used in the statute, might refer to freedom from disease rather than freedom from
physical injury. Id. at 683. The court concluded that the statutory language clearly proscribes
inflicting personal injury on a child. Id. The possibility that the statute might proscribe
emotional maltreatment was not recognized.
36. See State v. Moore, 459 N.E.2d 1120, 1122 (Il. 1984) (holding evidence defendant
spanked her daughter after the daughter was burned on the buttocks was insufficient to sustain a
conviction for endangering the life or health of a child).
37. For example, Nevada defines "abuse or neglect of a child" to mean: "(a) Physical or
mental injury of a nonaccidental nature; (b) Sexual abuse or sexual exploitation; or (c) Negligent
treatment or maltreatment...." NEV. REV. STAT. § 432B.020 (1991). "Mental injury" is defined
as "an injury to the intellectual or psychological capacity or the emotional condition of a child as
evidenced by an observable and substantial impairment of his ability to function within his
normal range of performance or behavior." Id. § 432B.070. Although this definition appears to be
specific, no objective criteria for measurement are given, nor are specific behaviors suggested for
observation. Thus, any evaluation of "mental injury" would be purely subjective.
1992]
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child endangerment."3 However, "substantial harm to mental health" is not
defined, nor is a method for measuring it mandated.
It should be noted that in practice, the difference between a type I
statute (which does not address emotional maltreatment per se and focuses
on physical maltreatment) and a type II statute (which outlaws emotional
maltreatment, but does not clearly define it) may be a matter of judicial
interpretation. For instance, the Colordado statute contains the following
language:
A person commits child abuse if such person causes an injury to a child's
life or health or permits a child to be unreasonably placed in a situation
which poses a threat of injury to the child's life or health, or engages in a
continued pattern of conduct which results in malnourishment, lack of
proper medical care, cruel punishment, mistreatment, or an accumula-
tion of injuries which ultimately results in the death of a child or serious
bodily injury to a child.39
In addition, the dependency and neglect sections of the Colorado statute
provide the following definitions:
"Abuse" or "child abuse or neglect" means an act or omission in one of the
following categories which threatens the health or welfare of a child:
(I) Any case in which a child exhibits evidence of skin bruising,
bleeding, malnutrition, failure to thrive, burns, fracture of any
bone, subdural hematoma, soft tissue swelling, or death and
either: Such condition or death is not justifiably explained; the
history given concerning such condition is at variance with the
degree or type of such condition or death; or the circumstances
indicate that such condition may not be the product of an acciden-
tal occurrence; (II) Any case in which a child is subjected to sexual
assault or molestation, sexual exploitation, or prostitution; (III)
Any case in which a child is in need of services because the child's
parents, legal guardian, or custodian fails to take the same actions
to provide adequate food, clothing, shelter, medical care or super-
vision that a prudent parent would take.40
Although these provisions only list physical examples of injury to a
child's life or health, and there is no specific reference to mental injury, the
Colorado Supreme Court has held that the term "abuse" includes emotional
as well as physical abuse.41
38. MINN STAT. ANN. § 609.378(lXa)(1) (West Supp. 1993). As previously noted, the
Minnesota abuse reporting statute also specifically mentions causing mental injury in its
definition of child maltreatment. See supra notes 6-7.
39. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-6-401(1) (West 1990).
40. Id. § 19-3-303(lXa).
41. People v. D.A.KI, 596 P.2d 747, 750 (Colo.), appeal dismissed, 444 U.S. 987 (1979).
[Vol. 41
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The third type of statute refers to psychological maltreatment, and
offers a standard for ascertaining when such maltreatment is likely to have
occurred. For instance, Wisconsin's statute is quite specific: "Whoever is
exercising temporary or permanent control of a child and causes mental harm
to that child by conduct which demonstrates substantial disregard for the
mental well-being of the child is guilty of a Class C felony."42 The statute
defines "mental harm" as
substantial harm to a child's psychological or intellectual functioning
which may be evidenced by a substantial degree of certain characteristics
of the child including, but not limited to, anxiety, depression, withdrawal
or outward aggressive behavior. "Mental harm" may be demonstrated by
a substantial and observable change in behavior, emotional response or
cognition that is not within the normal range for the child's age and stage
of development.43
Statutes of this type apparently accept the proposition that children can be
severely injured in ways other than physical beating.
Another indicator of the legislative trend away from limiting legal
intervention to cases of severe physical abuse can be seen in statutes out-
lawing sexual abuse.44 These statutes outlaw both sexual contact with a child
such as fondling or intercourse, as well as covert types of sexual activities
with children such as exploitation of children in sexually explicit pictures or
movies. 45 Both types of provisions are likely to complement each other. For
example, Tennessee's statute lists sexual exploitation as one of six acts that
constitute child sexual abuse. 46 Georgia's statute includes both sexual
assault and sexual exploitation of a child in its definition of child abuse. 47
Some statutes specifically delineate not only the inappropriate acts, but also
outline the harm caused by sexual abuse. For example, California defines
42. WIS. STAT. § 948.04(1) (1991).
43. Id. § 948.04(2). For other examples of type III statutes, see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-
517(lXd) (1991), and WYO. STAT. § 14-3-202(aXii) (1991).
44. Some forms of sexual maltreatment, because of their violent or physically intrusive
nature, qualify as acts of severe physical abuse. In addition, "all types of sexual abuse or
exploitation are also forms of serious psychological abuse." DOUGLAS J. BESHAROV,
RECOGNIZING CHILD ABUSE 115 (1990). Categorization of child maltreatment, although useful
for some purposes, is an over-simplification in general.
45. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.44.020(12), (15) (West Supp. 1991).
46. TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-602 (1991). The other acts are penile penetration of the
vagina or anal opening, oral-genital contact, any intrusion of the genitals or anal opening of
another person, intentional touching of the genitals or intimate parts or the clothing covering
them, and exposure of the perpetrator's genitals or perpetration of other sexual acts in the
presence of a child for the purpose of sexual arousal, gratification, aggression, degradation, or
similar purpose. Id.
47. GA. CODE ANN. § 49-5-180(5XC)-(D) (1990).
1992] 491
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child abuse as a situation "in which a child suffers from... harm by reason of
intentional neglect or malnutrition or sexual abuse."4
Like emotional maltreatment, sexual maltreatment could reasonably be
subsumed within a broader anti-abuse statute. Most statutes, however, opt
for specific provisions. For example, Florida has a statute that specifically
addresses deprivation of food, clothing, shelter, medical treatment, or the
infliction of physical or mental injury to the child or "any act which causes or
tends to cause or encourage any person under the age of [eighteen] years to
become a delinquent or dependent child or a child in need of services."
49
Florida civil statutes addressing prevention of child abuse and neglect define
harm to a child's health or welfare to include sexual battery and sexual
abuse.r' In addition, the Florida statute also contains a specific prohibition
against the sexual performance of a child.51 This prohibition is directed at
movies, photographs, or live public appearances in which a child is engaged
in sexual conduct.52
None of these presumably well intentioned statutes53 change the
essentially "after-the-fact" nature of state intervention. As this Article
argues, ex post facto application makes these attempts fundamentally inade-
quate to reduce the incidence and severity of child maltreatment.
Furthermore, the laws may be over-inclusive. 54 Obviously, not everything
that is potentially harmful to children is, or should be, classified as a crime.
For example, it is of course not a crime to raise children in poverty. Failing to
provide children with adequate food and shelter is not a crime if the parent
cannot afford to provide these things.55 The parent may still be held to a
moral obligation to seek outside sources of aid, however, when he cannot
provide enough.56 Failure to do so is child neglect.5 7
Similarly, statutes specifically identifying emotional maltreatment as
harmful and subject to state intervention by implication impose a comparable
affirmative obligation on parents to find other sources of essentials-in this
case psychological essentials-which they are not capable of providing for
48. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 18951(eX2) (West 1990).
49. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 827.04(1)-(3) (West Supp. 1991).
50. Id. § 415.503(9Xb).
51. Id. § 827.07(l)-(5).
52. Id. § 827.071.
53. Some of the statutes examined in this Article are explicitly criminal, while others are
characterized as social welfare interventions. Criminalization of many acts or omissions classified
as child abuse or neglect may well be an essential part of a system that effectively reduces or
eliminates maltreatment, but the debate over whether to impose criminal sanctions in
maltreatment cases is beyond the scope of this Article.
54. For instance, such statutes are particularly prone to the charge that they favor
majoritarian views on appropriate child rearing to the exclusion of other points of view. See
generally KAT7_, supra note 5, at 52-82.
55. See generally Areen, supra note 33.
56. See BESHAROV, supra note 44, at 99-107.
57. See BESHAROV, supra note 44, at 99-107.
[Vol. 41
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their children. Unlike situations involving economic or educational impover-
ishment, however, other sources of emotional support are less readily
available and less organized. Moreover, even recognizing the need for help
presupposes a level of insight and emotional functioning that may simply not
be there.
Theoretically, more specific and exhaustive statutes dealing with child
maltreatment could promote more effective intervention that could save more
children from the dire consequences of maltreatment. Statutory recognition
of the psychological effects of parental behavior would require courts to exam-
ine a very important facet of the parent-child relationship. In 1971, when
such statutes were rare, Sanford N. Katz said:
[It is] highly desirable that legislative recognition be given to "emotional
neglect" as an independent legal standard. This view is a result of expe-
rience showing a judicial reluctance to carve out categories of neglect
that are not clearly provided for in the statute itself. Specific statutory
reference to mental health would provide the needed "peg" upon which to
hang a finding of emotional deprivation."
Enforcement of prohibitions against emotional and sexual maltreat-
ment is fraught with the same difficulties that impede enforcement of
statutes criminalizing physical abuse of children. Proof is difficult at best.
Inadequate funds and overworked social service staffs ensure only a fraction
of the most blatant cases of physical abuse will be adequately investigated
and followed. In such a system, many children will not be helped.
Even with more funding and larger social service staffs, statutes broad-
ening the legal definition of child abuse cannot save children from emotional
and sexual abuse. In essence, ex post statutes are inherently ill-suited to
address the complex psychological and social dynamics of emotional and
sexual child maltreatment.
III. PSYCHOLOGICAL DYNAMICS OF ABUSE AND NEGLECT
Social scientists preceded legislators in distinguishing among different
types of abuse and neglect. Categorization of acts of maltreatment is an
oversimplification, but it does facilitate research and discussion of certain
dynamics.
Physical abuse and neglect have long been recognized, although the
definition of these terms may remain unsettled. Sexual abuse has also been
long recognized by the social science and mental health professions. "Sexual
58. KATZ, supra note 54, at 68. Katz is quick to acknowledge "that by using their discretion
in interpreting and applying statutory guides for intervention, judges have enormous power to
establish, administer, and reorganize families according to their own values, biases, and
prejudices." KATZ, supra note 54, at 68.
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abuse refers to involvement, by an individual at least [five] years older than
the child, in sexual activities that the child does not fully comprehend [and]
to which the child is unable to give informed consent."59 Sexual abuse may
include genital contact, genital-oral contact, fondling with or without cloth-
ing, and noncontact activities such as utilization of children in pornographic
pictures or forcing children to witness sexual activities.60
Emotional abuse and neglect represent another dimension of child mal-
treatment. Emotional abuse includes "verbal or emotional assault, close
confinement and threatened harm,"61 while emotional neglect includes
"inadequate nurturanceaffection, knowingly permitting maladaptive behav-
ior, and refusal to provide essential care."6 2 Psychological maltreatment can
be defined as "a concerted attack by an adult on a child's development of self
and social competence, a pattern of psychologically destructive behavior."6
Experts generally recognize it is rare for one type of maltreatment to
occur independently of other forms of maltreatment. 64- Moreover, the adverse
psychological consequences of a caretaker's behavior can cause that behavior
to be defined as abusive. 65 Evidence supports the view that "psychological
maltreatment is present in all forms of abuse and that the resulting
psychological damage is not necessarily related to the extent of physical
damage."66
All types of abuse and neglect can have very serious consequences.
Except for a relatively small percentage of cases in which children are in
danger of death or permanent physical injury, the most debilitating injuries
are emotional.6 7 Because more than one type of abuse or neglect will likely
occur within the same family, conclusions about the damage from a particular
kind of maltreatment must be viewed with some caution. There is a clear
consensus, however, that there is a high correlation between maltreatment
and certain problems and dysfunctions. 68 Although certainties are rare,
59. Michael S. Jellinek & David B. Herzog, The Child, in THE NEW HARVARD GUIDE TO
PSYCHIATRY 607, 631 (Armand Nicholi, Jr. M.D. ed., 1988).
60. See ENGEI4 supra note 14, at 23.
61. KARP & KARP, supra note 17, § 3.07 (citing JAMES GARBARINO ET AL., THE
PSYCHOLOGICALLY BATTERED CHILD 4 (1987)).
62. KARP & KARP, supra note 17, § 3.07.
63. KARP & KARP, supra note 17, § 3.07 (citing GARBARINO & GILLIAM, supra note 34, at
8).
64. GARBARINO & GILLIAM, supra note 32, at 7-8.
65. GARBARINO & GILLIAM, supra note 32, at 7-8.
66. Maria E. Brassard & Linda E. McNeil, Child Sexual Abuse, in PSYCHOLOGICAL
MALTREATMENT OF CHILDREN AND YOUTH 69, 69 (Marla E. Brassard et al. eds., 1987) (citing
Elizabeth L. Navance, Psychological Maltreatment: The Cave Component of Child Abuse, in
PSYCHOLOGICAL MALTREATMENT OF CHILDREN AND YOUTH, supra, at 45).
67. GARBARINO & GILLIAM, supra note 32, at 13.
68. See, e.g., James Garbarino, The Incidence and Prevalence of Child Maltreatment, in 11
FAMILY VIOLENCE, supra note 31, at 219; see also ELIANA GIL, TREATMENT OF ADULT
SURVIVORS OF CHILDHOODABUSE 3-54 (1988).
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social science and mental health professionals have drawn a number of con-
clusions about child maltreatment.
First, maltreatment is not an isolated event. Rather, it is a continuing
pattern of inappropriate and damaging interactions between caretakers and
children.6 9 It is rare to find only one form or instance of maltreatment in a
family; usually there are several at the same time or over time. 70 Second, the
serious psychological damage resulting from any type of maltreatment is the
most disruptive effect on the child's short- and long-term functioning.71 The
severity of these psychological effects is not directly related to the amount of
physical injury suffered.72 Finally, a pattern of child maltreatment tends to
pass from generation to generation.7 3 Some of the possible long-term effects,
such as substance abuse or sexual aggression, make child maltreatment a
full-scale social problem.
A. Maltreatment as a Pattern of Interaction
Psychiatric studies of parents that physically abuse their children
reveal a complicated constellation of dysfunctional parent-child interactions.
In one study, child abuse was described as "a pattern of child rearing charac-
terized by derailment of the normal mothering function." 74 The basic
ingredients of mothering are usually, but not always, performed by a mother
and include "mechanical" components such as feeding, holding, clothing, or
protecting the infant, and "subtle" components such as tenderness,
"awareness and consideration of the needs and desires of the infant, and...
appropriate emotional interaction with [the infant]." 75 Studies do not reveal a
basic personality disorder common to abusive parents,7 6 although these
parents frequently share a pattern of childhood experiences characterized by
excessive and unrealistic demands placed on them as children, lack of nurtur-
ing, perfectionism, and constant criticism. 77
69. See infra text accompanying notes 74-84.
70. See infra text accompanying notes 85-106.
71. See GARBARINO & GILLIAM, supra note 32, at 8-10.
72. See GARBARINO & GILLIAM, supra note 32, at 8-10.
73. See generally Michael Rutter, Intergenerational Continuities and Discontinuities in
Serious Parenting Difficulties, in CHILD MALTREATMENT 317, 317-48 (Dante Cicchetti & Vicki
Carlson eds., 1989).
74. Brandt F. Steele & Carl B. Pollock, A Psychiatric Study of Parents Who Abuse Infants
and Small Children, in THE BATTERED CHILD 103, 113 (Ray E. Heifer & C. Henry Kempe eds.,
1968).
75. Id.
76. See generally John J. Spinetta & David Rigler, The Child-Abusing Parent: A
Psychological Review, in TRAUMATIC ABUSE AND NEGLECT OF CHILDREN AT HOME, supra note
27, at 117; see also Steele & Pollock, supra note 74, at 108-11.
77. Steele & Pollock, supra note 74, at 111-13; see also Spinetta & Rigler, supra note 76, at
113-14.
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Abuse is rarely isolated or even sporadic instances of violence; rather, it
is an environment.8 It is the atmosphere and the overall quality of the
parent-child relationship that are pathogenic, not isolated acts of parental
cruelty.
In the case of physical abuse, it is often assumed that the abuse occurs in
an otherwise normal home.... [I]n addition to overt abuse and neglect,
[however,] the homes of many of these children are characterized by
chaos, disruption, and disorganization. Drug and alcohol abuse are
common, the mothers often are physically abused, and in general, the
homes provide a very aversive environment for raising children. For the
maltreated children, the home environment fails to meet the needs of the
child in many different areas.7
9
Characterizing child maltreatment as an environment or destructive
pattern of interaction is well illustrated by drawing an analogy between mal-
treatment and a fever. Specific incidents of child maltreatment indicate a
dysfunctional pattern of family interactions just as fevers indicate disease in
the body. Specific acts of child maltreatment are usually not life threatening
in themselves, and only a small percentage result in immediate injuries
requiring medical attention.80 A very high fever or extreme acts of abuse,
however, could in themselves be life threatening.
Patterns of parent-child interaction that characterize child maltreat-
ment, such as over stimulating the child,81 failing to empathize with the child
and ignoring his needs,8 2 using the child to fulfill the adults' needs,83 and
imposing age-inappropriate expectations on the child violate the child's self
image in many ways.84
B. Adverse Effects of Child Maltreatment
As noted above, one can rarely be certain a particular act will have a
specific effect on an individual child. There are too many variables, including
the child's personality, vulnerabilities, and defenses. Many mental health
professionals, however, agree that child maltreatment leads to characteristic
short- and long-term problems for a significant percentage of maltreated
children. For instance, Eliana Gil, a therapist and writer specializing in
78. Byron Egeland & Martha Farrell Erickson, Psychologically Unavailable Caregiving, in
PSYCHOLOGICAL MALTREATMENT OF CHILDREN AND YOUTH, supra note 66, at 110, 115.
79. Id. at 115-16.
80. GARBARINO & GILLIAM, supra note 32, at 8-9.
81. LEONARD SHENGOLD, SOUL MURDER 1-3 (1989).
82. See generally Steele & Pollock, supra note 74, at 106-26.
83. See, e.g., ALICE MILLER, THE DRAMA OF THE GIFTED CHILD 5-9 (1981). See also
chapter two of SUSAN FORWARD, TOXIC PARENTS (1989), which is titled "Just Because You
Didn't Mean It Doesn't Mean It Didn't Hurt-The Inadequate Parents." Id. at 31-48.
84. See, e.g., Steele & Pollock, supra note 74, at 110-11.
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childhood abuse, divides the symptoms of adult survivors of child abuse into
three main categories: psychosocial problems, physical and eating disorder
problems, and relationship and sexual problems.8
Psychosocial problems include depression; low self-esteem; dissociative
phenomena; alcohol, drug, gambling, or other addictions; self-mutilation;
suicide attempts; and parenting problems.86 Physical and eating disorder
problems include anorexia, bulimia, obesity, headaches, stomachaches, skin
problems, and various other diseases and infections.87 Relationship and
sexual problems include unstable relationships, poor choice of partners,
orgasmic disorders, desire disorders, and promiscuity.88 There also appears
to be a high correlation between childhood abuse and both post traumatic
stress disorder and multiple personality disorder.8 9 Moreover, abused
children are more likely to run away from home, and are more likely to
engage in delinquent behavior.90
The effect abuse will have on a maltreated child will, of course, vary
with the individual child. Some children are more vulnerable, although
others, to the puzzlement of researchers, appear to emerge unscathed from
objectively horrendous family circumstances. 91 In order to survive abusive
homes, however, most children must employ one or more psychological
defenses. A complete discussion of the dynamics of psychological defenses is
beyond the scope of this Article. This section will, however, briefly discuss
four defenses frequently encountered in abused children: repression, denial,
self-blame, and projection.
Repression is the eradication of a traumatic memory from the conscious
mind.92 A child that has been physically harmed, verbally attacked, or
sexually molested may simply not remember the event in order to avoid
bringing up extremely painful feelings the child cannot handle.93 This is not,
however, a benevolent memory loss because it takes a tremendous amount of
psychic energy to repress an event-energy that the child could instead use to
develop a healthy self image.94 In addition, a traumatic event may never be
entirely forgotten, and may surface later in frightening nightmares, painful
85. GIL, supra note 68, at 49-54.
86. GIL, supra note 68, at 49-51.
87. GIL, supra note 68, at 51-52.
88. GIL, supra note 68, at 52-54.
89. GIL, supra note 68, at 54.
90. See generally DAVID SANDBERG, THE CHILD ABUSE-DELINQUENCY CONNECTION
(1989).
91. GARBARINO & GILLIAM, supra note 32, at 5 (citing Maya Pines, Invulnerability:
Pioneer Studies, PSYCH. TODAY, Jan. 1979, at 58-61).
92. See generally ALICE MILLER, THOU SHALT NOT BE AWARE: SOCIETY'S BETRAYAL OF
THE CHILD (1986).
93. See generally id.
94. BEVERLY JAMES, TREATING TRAUMATIZED CHILDREN 158 (1989). For one theoretical
approach to understanding the energy used to suppress the emotions associated with a traumatic
event, see MILLER, supra note 85.
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flashbacks, or destructive behavior.95 Moreover, many therapists believe a
victim that has repressed traumatic events may unconsciously seek to re-
enact them until the victim can achieve mastery over the attacker." This is
sometimes referred to as "repetition compulsion," and may explain why
adults abused as children often re-enact their families of origin, either as
abuser or victim. 97
Denial is the partial or complete refusal to accept the reality of a
painful situation.98 Unlike repression, in which key parts of an event are
banished from consciousness, a person in denial may recall entire events, yet
be unable to cognitively recognize the meaning of those events. 99 For
instance, a child may see his parents intoxicated nightly, but wil vehemently
deny they are alcoholics. Similarly, a child may suffer from intense physical
or emotional abuse, but will insist that he has "the best parents in the world."
A victim that accepts responsibility for the abuse engages in self-
blame. 100 In other words, the child concludes he was hit or humiliated
because he somehow deserved it. Not only does this relieve the parent from
responsibility, but it gives the child the illusion that he has some control over
a situation in which he is, in fact, powerless. 10 1 This illusion manifests itself
in the child's belief that the abuse will stop if the child is "better." The truth
is that the parent's actions are not the result of the child's behavior, but are a
manifestation of the adult's own needs, which will likely not be affected by a
change in the child's behavior. 102
Projection is almost the opposite of self-blame; it is the refusal to accept
responsibility for one's own actions.103 In the context of abuse, it is best
illustrated by the attitude of many abusive adults toward their child victims:
"You were so bad I had no choice but to beat you," or "You seduced me so I
had to take you to bed with me." This "blame-the-victim" mentality is often
imitated by abused children when dealing with individuals smaller or less
powerful than themselves. 10 4 They are essentially modeling the adult
behavior directed at them. For example, an abused child may hurt younger
children or animals, and may explain his sadistic behavior by claiming the
95. See ENGEL, supra note 14, at 71-74.
96. See generally MILLER, supra note 83.
97. See generally MILLER, supra note 83.
98. See ENGEI4 supra note 14, at 42-44.
99. See ENGEL, supra note 14, at 5-7.
100. See generally Jessica Cameronchild, An Autobiography of Violence, in TRAUMATIC
ABUSE AND NEGLECT OF CHILDREN AT HOME, supra note 27, at 21.
101. Id. at 26-27.
102. See ENGEI, supra note 14, at 31-35, 76-78.
103. See THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1448 (2d ed. 1992) (definition 8b. under
"projection").
104. Edward Mueller & Nancy Silverman, Peer Relations in Maltreated Children, in CHILD
MALTREATMENT, supra note 73, at 529, 564-661.
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victim "asked for it" or "deserved it."105 When they become parents them-
selves, these children may continue to use projection as their main defense,
and will essentially identify with the aggressor that attacked them as
children, thus perpetuating the cycle of abuse for yet another generation. 106
C. Child Maltreatment as an Intergenerational Pattern
Child maltreatment has a tendency to pass from one generation to
another.10 7 This is to be expected because people learn much about parenting
from their own parents.108 This intergenerational pattern has-societal ripple
effects because maltreatment is linked to such problems as running away
from home, substance abuse, sexual disfunction, and depression.109
One study of physically abusive parents found emotional neglect to be a
prominent factor in the childhood of all the parents studied:
[AIll of our parents were deprived as infants and children. We are not
concerned here with material deprivation ....
We are referring to deprivation of ... being cared for and cared
about from the beginning of one's life.
The central issue involved concerns a breakdown in what we have
referred to earlier as "mothering"-a disruption of the maternal affec-
tional system. 110
Any theoretical framework based in part on the importance of early
childhood experiences recognizes deficient parenting in one generation will
likely have an impact on the quality of parenting in the next. "The reason...
parents mistreat their children has less to do with character and tempera-
ment than with the fact that they were mistreated themselves .... "111
There are a number of possible explanations for the similarity of action
and experience between generations. For example, the psychoanalytic tradi-
tion argues that individuals have a tendency to repeat traumatic situations
from the past. 112 Learning theories argue a person's behavior is shaped by
105. One child attending a Parents Anonymous child care session at which I was the
facilitator said he would not feed his cat because the cat "doesn't deserve to eat."
. 106. Joan Kaufman & Edward Zigler, The Intergenerational Transmission of Child Abuse,
in CHILD MALTREATMENT, supra note 73, at 129, 136-37.
107. Id.
108. See infra text accompanying notes 111-14.
109. See infra text accompanying notes 86-90.
110. Steele & Pollock, supra note 74, at 112.
111. ALICE MILLER, FOR YOUR OWN GOOD 105 (Hildegarde Hannum & Hunter Hannum
trans., 1983).
112. This concept is sometimes described as a "repetition compulsion.' A person that was
abusively treated in childhood might repeat the pattern in adult life, and depending on various
factors could be in the aggressor's role.
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imitation and reinforcement throughout life. 113 Children learn parenting and
other social behaviors from their families of origin, and then go on to repeat
these behaviors with their own children. 1 14
Although abusive parents are likely to have been maltreated them-
selves, not all maltreated children will in turn abuse their children. One
study indicates that approximately one-third of the people abused in child-
hood will grow up to abuse their own children. 15 Some researchers suggest
that a key factor for people who do not go on to abuse their children is the
insight that their own parents were wrong to abuse them. 1 6 Moreover,
among those who do become abusive parents, the type of abuse suffered by
the parents as children will not necessarily be the same kind they inflict on
their children. 117
IV. THE DISAPPOINTING INTERACTION OF AFTER-THE-FACT STATUTES
AND PSYCHOLOGICAL DYNAMICS
The limitations of most current statutes addressing emotional or sexual
child maltreatment become clearer in view of the psychological dynamics
discussed above. This Article has claimed there are at least three reasons
these statutes are inherently ineffective in dealing with the problems of emo-
tional or sexual abuse. First, there is no meaningful intervention until
substantial damage has already been done to the child. 118 Second, due to the
nature of emotional and sexual abuse and the ways in which children
typically cope with it, proof of harm or other triggers for intervention may not
become apparent until the victim is no longer a child.11 Finally, it is even
more difficult to delineate and recognize the behaviors constituting emotional
or sexual abuse than it is to define physically abusive behaviors. 120 This
section will re-examine each of these claims in light of the current psychologi-
cal views discussed above.
113. Cf W.W. Meissner, Theories of Personality, i n THE NEW HARVARD GUIDE TO
PSYCHIATRY, supra note 59, at 171, 197-98.
114. Id.
115. Daniel Goleman, Sad Legacy of Abuse: The Search For Remedies, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24,
1989, at C1, C6.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. See supra text accompanying notes 11-14.
119. See supra text accompanying notes 15-17.
120. See supra text accompanying notes 17-18.
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A. Intervention Only After Harm Has Been Done
The statutes examined in this Article,1 2' whether addressing "mental
injury,"122 "harm by reason of sexual abuse,"123 "mental harm,"124 material
endangerment of the physical or mental health of a child causing permanent
disability, 25 or injury to the child's health or welfare, 126 are statutes that
allow intervention in the family only after provable abuse has caused
demonstrable harm.127 Because abuse tends to be an entire dysfunctional
environment acting on a child over a period of time, 28 the child is likely to
have suffered enormous damage before any external proof of harm is visible.
Far from being a phenomenon limited to cases of emotional or sexual abuse,
this problem is frequently illustrated in cases of gross physical abuse. 29
"How is it," we ask ourselves after the fact, "that none of us noticed the
twarning signs in time to stop this child from being beaten to the point of
death or permanent disability?" Yet even if we were able to intervene and
stop life-threatening physical abuse, the long-standing and insidious
character of an inadequate psychological climate makes effective and timely
intervention in such cases less likely.
In one infamous case in New York, six-year-old Lisa Steinberg was
viciously beaten to death by her father. 30 Subsequent investigations
suggested the physical abuse was only one factor in an environment charac-
terized by emotional abuse and neglect, sexual exploitation, and substance
abuse. 13' Even if Lisa's life had been saved and her physical health restored,
and even if further physical abuse and neglect could have been prevented, it
is extremely likely severe psychological damage had already been, and would
continue to be, inflicted on the child. The child's mother recounted that Lisa's
father abused Lisa verbally as well as physically. 1" 2 Lisa's relationship with
her mother was competitive, and it does not appear her mother had many
warm, maternal feelings toward the child.133 Both parents were addicted to
drugs, and may have participated in or allowed the sexual abuse of Lisa. 3 4
121. See supra text accompanying notes 20-58.
122. See supra text accompanying notes 37-38.
123. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 18951(2), (4) (West 1991).
124; WIS. STAT. §§ 948.01(2), .04 (1991).
125. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 827.04 (West Supp. 1991).
126. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-15-401 (Supp. 1990).
127. See supra text accompanying notes 6-7.
128. See supra text accompanying notes 74-84.
129. See generally Kempe et al., supra note 27. Because one clinical indicator of battered
child syndrome is bone fractures in various stages of healing, it follows that injuries occur over a
period of time and are detected later.
130. JOYCE JOHNSON, WHAT LISA KNEW 269-78 (1990).
131. Id. at 177-79, 187-90.
132. Id. at 264-78.
133. Id. at 151-53.
134. Id. at 170-72.
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This picture of family life is the epitome of "a very aversive environment for
raising children,"1 5 and a breakdown of mothering. 136
The kinds of warning signs or evidence of harm envisioned by child
maltreatment statutes, however, were either not yet present, or hidden from
public view. "In her striped Oshkosh overalls and her Health-Tex T-shirts,
Lisa looked just as carefully nurtured as the other Greenwich Village five-
year-olds in her class."13 7 Teachers recalled vague impressions that there was
nothing unusual about Lisa's relationship with her parents. 138 Everyone
assumed Lisa was a normal, happy little girl. 13 9 She was described "'as an
extremely articulate, very verbal, beautiful kid to look at.'" 140 "She was a
cooperative and cheerful little girl, very popular with the other students.
[Her kindergarten teacher] found her demonstrably affectionate, the kind of
child who'd come up to you and wind her arms around your waist."14 1 At least
around her classmates and teachers, Lisa apparently did not exhibit
suspicious behaviors that might have indicated she was a maltreated child.
To all outward appearances, Lisa and her father adored each other-
she was Daddy's girl, exquisitely attuned to her father's desires and adept at
pleasing him. 142 Yet, in this kind of symbiotic relationship, it can be argued
that Lisa assumed the parental role, providing nurturing and support to her
father. Such a relationship can ultimately be very damaging: it forces a child
to use resources that should properly be applied to her own developing
personality to reinforce and support her parents' shaky personalities. 143
Ultimately, the child may not get the emotional guidance she needs to
develop into a healthy adult and may continue to seek fulfillment of her own
needs from anyone possible, including her own children. 44 The seeds of
severe personality disturbances had clearly been planted in Lisa.
This troubling case illustrates how the subtlety or absence of signs of
abuse make after-the-fact maltreatment laws ineffective. Unfortunately, the
Lisa Steinberg case is not unique. Children may be severely harmed by
parents for years without detection or without any clear signals the child is at
risk. Depression, acting out, and other behaviors indicating a child has been
maltreated may also occur for other reasons; a fact that makes the judgment
about when to intervene in the parent-child relationship even more diffi-
135. See supra text accompanying note 79.
136. See supra text accompanying note 74.
137. JOHNSON, supra note 130, at 195.
138. JOHNSON, supra note 130, at 195-96.
139. JOHNSON, supra note 130, at 197.
140. JOHNSON, supra note 130, at 195 (quoting Elliot Koreman, Lisa's principal).
141. JOHNSON, supra note 130, at 196.
142. JOHNSON, supra note 130, at 185-86, 207-11.
143. Interview with Ruth Kempe, speaker at Family Law and the Best Interest of the Child:
An Interdisciplinary Conference (April 11, 1991).
144. Id.
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cult.145 Legitimate concerns about privacy and protection of family autonomy
may also cause society to err on the side of nonintervention.
B. Characteristic Defenses and Delayed Symptoms
An additional problem, due to characteristic psychological reactions of
children, is that the extent of the damage inflicted on an emotionally or sexu-
ally abused child may not become evident until months or years after the
harmful interactions. 146 Lisa Steinberg apparently used psychological coping
mechanisms, such as repression or self-blame, which effectively hid her
anguish from outsiders. 147 To some extent, most children will instinctively
hide maltreatment from others, or even from themselves. 148
One reason for this may be that children have a basic need to view their
primary caretakers as nurturing and supportive figures. 49 If nurturing and
support are not sufficiently forthcoming, the trauma to the child is enormous,
even life threatening. 150 To maintain psychic equilibrium, the child
instinctively clings to the image of the parent as good, even if there is little
objective evidence to support that view. 51 "To children--even adolescents-
their parents are like gods." 5 2 One commentator presents a convincing
explanation for this phenomenon:
[T]he child who is tormented by a parent must frequently call on that
same parent for help and rescue. The other parent is only too often weak
or absent, or is at least an unconscious abettor of the tormentor.... If the
child must turn to the very parent who inflicts abuse and who is felt as
bad for relief of the distress that the parent has caused, then the child
must break with what has been experienced and out of a desperate need
for rescue, must register the parent, delusionally, as good. Only the
mental image of a good parent who will rescue can help the child deal
with the terrifying intensity of fear and rage that is the effect of the tor-
menting experiences. The alternative-to maintain the overwhelming
stimulation and bad parental image-means annihilation of identity, of
the feeling of the self. So the bad has to be registered as good. This is a
mind-splitting or mind-fragmenting operation. To survive, such children
must keep in some compartment of their minds the delusion of good
145. See, e.g., GARBARINO & GILLIAM, supra note 32, at 5-10.
146. See generally GIL, supra note 68, at 40-47.
147. See generally JOHNSON, supra note 130.
148. See Cameronchild, supra note 100, at 21.
149. SHENGOLD, supra note 81, at 26 (1989).
150. One researcher documented a high infant mortality rate (over 30% in the first two
years of the study) in a sample of institutionalized children whose physical needs were shown to
be adequately met. See RENI A. SPITZ, THE FIRST YEAR OF LIFE: A PSYCHOANALYTIC STUDY
OF NORMAL AND DEVIANT DEVELOPMENT OF OBJECT RELATIONS 281 (1965).
151. SHENGOLD, supra note 81, at 26.
152. M. SCOTT PECK, THE PEOPLE OF THE LIE 60 (1983).
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parents and the delusive promise that all the terror, pain, and hate will
be transformed into love. 153
Another author presents the case of Christine F., whose unpredictable
father frequently subjected her to brutal beatings.154 Her mother typically
watched these incidents without intervening. 155 Christine later reported, "'I
somehow loved and respected my father in spite of it all. He towered above
other fathers in my eyes.'" 156
Sometimes children utilize the defense of repression to maintain the
image of the good parent and to otherwise survive psychologically. 157 When
faced with events too traumatic to cope with, the child may erase part or all
of the events from conscious perception. 158 Repression is probably a related
form of dissociative phenomena. 5 9 "The dissociative process is a sudden,
temporary alteration in the integrative functions of consciousness and/or
identity, whereby one's experience is separated from one's conscious aware-
ness."16 Some forms of dissociation are common and harmless-for example,
becoming "lost in thought" and missing one's bus stop. However, "[t]he
trauma victim [that] does not remember parts of what happened to him and
the person with multiple personalities has also dissociated, but more
intensely and with more potentially severe consequences." 16 1 The frequent
use of repression can interfere with a child's functioning and development. 6 2
Another defense is denial, under which the child refuses to see or
acknowledge the importance or meaning of the traumatic event.16 3 One
therapist explained:
"When you ask them if they were ever abused, they tell you, 'No,'"....
"But if you ask them to describe what would happen if they broke a rule,
they'll say something like, 'I was locked in a closet for a day, then beaten
with a belt until I was black and blue.' Then you ask them, was that
abuse? and their answer is, 'No, I was a bad kid and my parents had to
beat me to make me turn out okay.'" '64
153. SHENGOLD, supra note 81, at 26.
154. MILLER,supra note 111, at 110-12 (quoting CHRISTINE F., CHRISTINE F:
AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF A GIRL OF THE STREETS AND HEROIN ADDICT (Susanne Flatauer trans.,
1982)).
155. MILLER, supra note 111, at 111 (quoting CHRISTINE F., supra note 154).
156. MILLER, supranote 111, at 111 (quoting CHRISTINE F., supra note 154).
157. SHENGOLD, supra note 81, at 26.
158. See supra text accompanying notes 92-97.
159. BEVERLY JAMES, TREATING TRAUMATIZED CHILDREN 101 (1989).
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. See supra text accompanying notes 98-102. For an interesting example of denial, see
infra text accompanying notes 188-89.
164. Goleman, supra note 115, at C6 (quoting Dr. Richard Krugman).
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From a legal perspective, psychological defenses such as repression and
denial pose at least two major problems. First, it is even more difficult to
ascertain what happened between a child and a caretaking adult if the child
has defensively repressed or denied traumatic incidents. Thus, as in the Lisa
Steinberg case,1 65 there may not be any overt evidence to trigger legal
intervention. Even if an initial intervention can be justified, there are enor-
mous problems in proving the acts of maltreatment and the resulting harms.
When the victim and chief witness deny any abusive behavior has occurred,
the type of fact-finding required under our legal system is nearly impossible.
Moreover, therapeutic efforts to bring the repressed trauma into conscious-
ness' 6 or to overcome denial, may lead to a claim that the child, vulnerable to
suggestion, has been prompted to recount an untrue tale.1 6 7  In addition,
some researchers believe denying abuse is "part of the cycle by which abused
children become abusive parents."'6
Children may become even more entrenched in denial because of their
tendency to self-blame. 16 9 This tendency is usually reinforced by the parent's
tendency to project the blame for any abusive action onto the child.1 70
Parental idealization can be maintained in the face of abuse if the child
assumes responsibility for the abuse. This is indicated by the statement: "I
was a bad kid, and my parents had to beat me to make me turn out okay."' 71
Eliana Gil recounts an interview with Mary, a forty-one-year-old patient, who
still blamed herself for her mother's rejection:
Mary: When my mom would push me off her lap and send me to my
room, I would go curl up under my covers and suck my thumb.
Dr.G: What did you say to yourself as you lay there curled up with
your thumb in your mouth?
Mary: I'd tell myself I was dumb.
Dr.G: How did you phrase it?
Mary: I'd say, "You are dumb."'7 2
165. See supra text accompanying notes 130-44.
166. See JAMES, supra note 159, at 157-75.
167. See Jennifer Marie Batterman-Faunce & Gail S. Goodman, Effects of Context on
Accuracy and Suggestability of Child Witnesses, in CHILD VICTIMS, CHILD WITNESSES 301, 306
(Gail S. Goodman et al. eds. 1993); JOHN E.B. MYERS, LEGAL ISSUES IN CHILD ABUSE AND
NEGLECT 67-74 (1992). Even Dr. Sigmund Freud himself came to doubt the accuracy of "recalled"
traumas, eventually characterizing them as unrealized childhood sexual fantasies. But some
people think Freud was wrong. See generally, MILLER, supra note 111.
168. Goleman, supra note 115, at C6.
169. See supra text accompanying notes 100-02.
170. See supra text accompanying notes 103-06.
171. See supra text accompanying note 164.
172. GIL, supra note 68, at 170.
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In fact, Mary's mother was a physically and emotionally abusive woman
who was also an alcoholic. 173 Despite these facts, Mary did not find it easy to
relinquish the blame she had taken upon herself. The following exchange
between Dr. Gil and Mary demonstrates her reluctance:
Mary: God, I wish I had known what to do so she would have never
gotten mad at me and thrown me off her the way she used to do.
Dr.G: And I wish you could see now that it was not you who were
stupid or dumb. You were just a little girl who liked to sleep in
her Mommy's lap. You didn't do anything to make her mad.
Sometimes she just got mad because of other things. Can you
see that?
Mary: I guess so ....
Dr.G: But it's hard for you, because there's a little part of you that
wants to think it was your fault.
Mary: Why would I want to do that?
Dr.G: What do you think?
Mary: (Wipes away a few tears and blows her nose.) I guess if rm to
blame, then she isn't mean or a drunk.
Dr.G: I think that's probably true. But Mary, your mom is not alive
anymore and you are; and it would sure be nice if you could stop
thinking of yourself as a bad little girl, who is dumb and who
nobody would want. You are a very smart and pretty woman,
who has a lot to offer.
Mary: I just hate saying she's a drunk. I once hit a kid in the face who
laughed at her and called her a drunk.
Dr.G: It's very hard when others call your parents names and laugh at
them. The truth is Mary, that your mother was an alcoholic and
had a serious disease. She was not able to get help with that
problem. Because she drank she was not the best mother in the
world. She was very hard on you.
Mary: I hate hearing you say that.174
Another adult survivor of childhood maltreatment put it this way:
I can look back at my childhood and know that my father had a mean
streak. But I still make excuses for him because maybe he really did
believe that what he did for me was for my own good. In my head, I
know that what he did was horrible and that no child deserves to be
treated like I was treated. But in my gut, I still feel like a rotten kid who
deserved what he got. And I still feel so damned guilty that I couldn't
protect my mother. 1 5
173. GIL, supra note 68, at 170.
174. GIL, supra note 68, at 171-72.
175. FORWARD, supra note 83, at 222.
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The likelihood a child will blame himself further diminishes the
chances for meaningful third party intervention. Self-blame is potentially
very damaging to the child, and is likely to result in low self-esteem and
problems in relationships.17 6 "'The key [to successful treatment of adults
abused as children] is [getting them to] fac[e] the fact that their parents were
so cruel to them; they've bought the parent[s'] word that they were bad and
deserved it. The damage shows up in their intimate relationships: they're
waiting to get hit or used again.'" 1"
As noted above, adults abused as children have distorted and painful
relationships as adults. The law simply cannot, however, be expected to
protect people from such forms of pain. Realizing their own parents were
abusive may be essential in breaking the cycle of abuse. 178
C. Difficulties of Defining Emotional and Sexual Abuse
Defining any kind of maltreatment is difficult, but the difficulties
become even more evident in cases of possible emotional or sexual maltreat-
ment. A broad definition is possible, but a definition that clarifies specific
applications is problematic. One author defines emotional abuse as "an
assault on the child's psyche, 179 and emotional neglect as "a gross failure to
provide the emotional nurturing and the physical and cognitive stimulation
needed to prevent serious developmental deficits in children."180 This same
author also concludes the term "psychological maltreatment" is more useful
for describing "the parental behaviors that can cause serious conduct, cogni-
tive, affective, or other mental disorders in children."' 8 '
Whatever definition is used, parental behavior is the key concern
because it causes psychological harm to the child. Establishing causation is
an extremely complicated and unavoidably individualized process. Simply
put, behavior adequate for one child may be devastatingly inappropriate for
another child. Although severe forms of emotional maltreatment, such as
close confinement or torture, have clear and predictable effects on a child, in
less severe cases, assessments become more difficult. 8 2 Even mental health
professionals have difficulty predicting with any degree of certainty "whether
a particular parent's behavior will result in severe harm to the child."'83
176. GIL, supra note 68, at 49-54.
177. Goleman, supra note 115, at C6 (quoting Terry Hunt).
178. Goleman, supra note 115, at C6.
179. BESHAROV, supra note 44, at 114.
180. BESHAROV, supra note 44, at 115.
181. BESHAROV, supra note 44, at 114 (citing AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION,
DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (3d ed. 1980)).
182. These less severe cases include "inadequate nurturance and habitual scapegoating,
belittling, taunting, and rejecting behavior." BESHAROV, supr note 44, at 116.
183. BESHAROV, supra note 44, at 116.
1992]
HeinOnline  -- 41 Drake L. Rev. 507 1992
Drake Law Review
The use of rather vague terms such as "psychological harm"18 4 or
"mental injury"' requires factfinders to make a case-by-case determination,
but this is necessarily subjective, and offers little before-the-fact guidance.
Some suggest addressing this problem by intervening in "those patterns
of behavior that impose a high level of risk on their victims, that is, treatment
that would cause most normal children and teenagers to suffer some social or
psychological harm."186 Yet, the concept of a "normal" child or teenager
presents the same problem of subjective assessment without predictive use-
fulness as the concept of causation of harm.
Emotional maltreatment may be inflicted by body language, tone of
voice, facial expression, and words, all of which are difficult to pinpoint. 8 7
Outside a particular context, emotional maltreatment is especially difficult
to define precisely. For example, it does not make sense to characterize
opening windows or telling a child to take a bath as emotional abuse. Yet the
following exchange between Eliana Gil and her patient Charlene demon-
strates the power of those actions:
Dr.G: Was [your father] ever complaining about you or your
brothers?
Charlene: Oh, all the time, but mostly it was about me.
Dr.G: OK. What specific things about you did he complain about?
Charlene: Mostly that I was dirty.
Dr. G: Dirty?
Charlene: Yeah.
Charlene: He really didn't like me too much.
Dr. G: What gave you that feeling?
Charlene: He would say I smelled a lot.
Dr. G: And he said you were dirty?
Charlene: Yeah.
Dr. G: What did you think about what he said?
Charlene: Well, I just tried to smell better.
Dr.G: Did you ever understand what he was talking about?
Charlene: He kept screaming that my mother didn't bathe me... that
I had a horrible smell on my body. He didn't want anyone to
come to the house, because he said they would vomit if they
smelled me.
Dr.G: How did you react to the things he said?
Charlene: I felt... you know... bad.
Dr.G: Like you were doing something bad? Or you just were bad?
Charlene: I thought I was just bad. There was something wrong with
me.
184. See supra text accompanying notes 3741.
185. See supra text accompanying notes 3741.
186. GARBARINO & GILLIAM, supra note 32, at 8.
187. GARBARINO & GILLIAM, supra note 32, at 11-13.
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Dr. G: And did you ever ask your mom about the smell that your
dad kept talking about?
Charlene: She just said that Dad was wrong and I shouldn't listen to
him... especially when he was drinking.
Dr.G: How old were you when your father first started complain-
ing about your smell?
Charlene: I don't know.
Dr.G: When's the first time you remember hearing about it?
Charlene: I think I was in kindergarten, because I was afraid to go to
school and have people notice it.
Dr.G: How long did your dad complain about it?
Charlene: He still does.
[When] I visit he opens the windows. He also asks anyone
who is visiting to leave. He also has Mom put out the paper
towels so I don't dirty anything. 1s
8
Gil comments:
[Charlene] does not understand why [her father] behaved towards her as
he did, and she is not really consciously aware of the many ways she may
have reacted. This is clearly a case of emotional abuse, and the impact
on this client has been enormous. It is probable that the way her father
treated her as a child is directly related to her inability to allow men to
be nice to her today. Charlene and her mother both used denial to cope
with living with an alcoholic, who may have been seriously emotionally
disturbed. Since her mother was unable to model a protective and
appropriate response to the father, Charlene never learned how to deal
with inappropriate, excessive, or abusive behavior directed towards
her.189
The harm to' the child seems intuitively obvious in this example.
Moreover, the difficulty of drafting a statute that could adequately address
such parental behavior is equally obvious.190 Even if a statute could silence
Charlene's father from making these belittling and untrue statements, it is
unlikely such a statute could define and address his obvious lack of empathy
for the child, his cruelty, or for that matter, his excessive drinking.
188. GIL, supra note 68, at 81-83.
189. GIL, supra note 68, at 86.
190. It is difficult to even imagine a statute that could specifically address the described
behavior without getting ridiculous. Consider: "It shall be unlawful to make untrue statements
about a child's body or appearance." An additional point to consider is how much the mother's
acquiescence in the father's abuse may have itself harmed Charlene.
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V. CONCLUSION
The psychological evidence convincingly demonstrates that individual
acts of maltreatment indicate serious flaws in the parent-child relationship.
The real damage is caused, however, byla constantly inadequate, nonem-
pathic emotional environment in which specific acts are only a symptom.
Specific acts are red flags, but they do not convey the whole story.
This Article has used psychological theories to argue that the dynamics
of sexual and emotional maltreatment of children make after-the-fact
statutes particularly inadequate to address those problems. Even when a law
can be invoked to intervene and curtail specific abusive behaviors, interven-
tion will not necessarily alter the underlying abusive relationships. If a
parent does not understand the essence of a healthy relationship with his
child, an ex post law directed at specific symptomatic behaviors simply
cannot solve the problem.
Psychological research supports the conclusion that law should respond
to unhealthy situations rather than only to specific acts of parents toward
children. To completely protect children from harm, the law would have to
eliminate destructive parent-child relationships in their entirety. This may
not be possible.
Ex-ante laws could, however, make these destructive relationships less
likely to occur by mandating programs and institutions that make help more
readily available to at-risk families. Laws could mandate child development,
child psychology, and parenting education; smaller student-teacher ratios,
and more school-based counseling staffs to give children not receiving enough
support at home more support in school. Other possibilities include more
economic support for family therapy and counseling, mandatory psychological
testing of parents and children to detect parenting problems, and more
support groups and classes for parents suffering, stress. Of course, laws
addressing the social, economic, and cultural problems associated with a
greater incidence of child maltreatment would also be beneficial.
It is important to recognize the inherent limitations of our child protec-
tion laws. Only when we admit where these laws fall short can we begin to
look for new, more effective ways of giving our children a meaningful oppor-
tunity to achieve their full human potential.
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